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I. INTRODUCTION

D
ISTRIBUTED machine learning is a promising way to manage the deluge of data that has been witnessed recently. With the training data of size ranging from 1T B to 1P B [1] , a centralized machine learning approach that collects and processes the data can lead to significant computational complexity and communications overhead. Therefore, a decentralized approach to machine learning is imperative to provide the scalability of the data processing and improve the quality of decision-making, while reducing the computational cost.
One suitable approach to decentralizing a centralized machine learning problem is alternating direction method of multiplier (ADMM). It enables distributed training over a network of collaborative nodes who exchange their results with the neighbors. However, the communications between two neighboring nodes create serious privacy concerns for nodes who process sensitive data including social network data, web search histories, financial information, and medical records. An adversary can observe the outcome of the learning and acquire sensitive information of the training data of individual nodes. The adversary can be either a member of the learning network who observes its neighbors or an outsider who observes the entire network. A privacy-preserving mechanism needs to automatically build into the distributed machine learning scheme to protect the internal and external adversaries throughout the entire dynamic learning process. Differential privacy is a suitable concept that provides a strong guarantee that the removal or addition of a single database item does not allow an adversary to distinguish (substantially) an individual data point [2] .
In this work, we focus on a class of distributed ADMM-based empirical risk minimization (ERM) problems, and develop randomized algorithms that can provide differential privacy [2] , [3] while keeping the learning procedure accurate. We extend the privacy concepts to dynamic differential privacy to capture the nature of distributed machine learning over networks, and propose two privacy-preserving schemes of the regularized ERM-based optimization. The first method is dual variable perturbation (DVP), in which we perturb the dual variable of each node at every ADMM iteration. The second is the primal variable perturbation (PVP) which leverages the output perturbation technique developed by Dwork et al. [2] by adding noise to the update process of the primal variable of each node of the ADMM-based distributed algorithm before sharing it to neighboring nodes.
We investigate the performance of the algorithms, and show that the DVP outperforms PVP. We characterize the fundamental tradeoffs between privacy and accuracy by formulating an optimization problem and use numerical experiments to demonstrate the optimal design of privacy mechanisms. The main contributions of the paper are summarized as follows:
We use ADMM to decentralize regularized ERM algorithms to achieve distributed training of large datasets. Dynamic differential privacy is guaranteed for the distributed algorithm using the DVP, which adds noise to the update of the dual variable. (ii)
We develop PVP method to add noise to the primal variables when they are transmitted to neighboring nodes. This approach guarantees dynamic differential privacy in which privacy is preserved at each update. (iii) We provide the theoretical performance guarantees of the PVP perturbations of the distributed ERM with l 2 regularization. The performance is measured by the number of sample data points required to achieve a certain criteria. Our theoretical results show that DVP is preferred for more difficult learning problems with a non-separable dataset or with small margin. (iv) We propose a design principle to select the optimal privacy parameters by solving an optimization problem. Numerical experiments show that the PVP outperforms the DVP at managing the privacyaccuracy tradeoff.
A. Related Work
There has been a significant amount of literature on the distributed classification learning algorithms. These works have mainly focused on either enhancing the efficiency of the learning model, or on producing a global classifier from multiple distributed local classifier trained at individual nodes. Researchers have focused on making the distributed algorithm suitable for large-scale datasets, e.g., MapReduce has been used to explore the performance improvements [4] . In addition, methods such as ADMM methods [5] , voting classification [6] , and mixing parameters [7] have been used to achieve distributed computation. Our approach to distributed machine learning is based on ADMM, in which the centralized problem acts as a group of coupled distributed convex optimization subproblems with the consensus constraints on the decision parameters over a network.
In privacy-preserving data mining research, the privacy can be pried through, for example, composition attacks, in which the adversary has some prior knowledge. Other works on data perturbation for privacy (e.g., [8] , [9] ) have focused on additive or multiplicative perturbations of individual samples, which might affect certain relationships among different samples in the database. A body of existing literature also have studied the differential-private machine learning. For example, Kasiviswanathan et al. have derived a general method for probabilistically approximately correct (PAC, [10] ) in [11] . Many works have investigated the tradeoff privacy and accuracy while developing and exploring the theory of differential privacy (examples include [2] , [12] , and [13] ). Also, an increasingly number of researches have studied the the cryptographic protocols for distributed differential privacy. Such works include multi-party distributed data aggregation [14] and private multi-party computations [15] . Eigner and Maffei developed the first framework for the automated verification of distributed differential privacy in [16] ; they developed a system to enforce the distributed differential privacy in cryptographic protocol implementations. In this work, we extend the notion of differential privacy to a dynamic setting, and define dynamic differential privacy to capture the distributed and iterative nature of the ADMM-based distributed ERM.
B. Organization of the Paper
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the ADMM approach to decentralizing a centralized ERM problem, and describe the privacy concerns associated with the distributed machine learning. In Section 3, we present dual and primal variable perturbation algorithms to provide dynamic differential privacy. The analysis of privacy guarantee for the algorithms is discussed. Section 4 studies the performance of the privacy-preserving algorithms. Section 5 presents numerical experiments to corroborate the results and optimal design principles to the tradeoff between privacy and accuracy. Finally, Section 6 presents concluding remarks and future research directions. Table I lists the notations frequently used in this paper. Note that in Table I , represents dual or pri m. 
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT
Consider a connected network, which contains P nodes described by an undirected graph G(P, E ) with the set of nodes P = {1, 2, 3, . . . , P}, and a set of edges E denoting the links between connected nodes. A particular node p ∈ P only exchanges information between its neighboring node j ∈ N p , where N p is the set of all neighboring nodes of node p, and N p = |N p | is the number of neighboring nodes of node p. The target of the centralized classification algorithm is to find a classifier f : X → Y using all available dataD that enables the entire network to classify any data x input to a label y ∈ {−1, 1}. Let Z C 1 ( f |D) be the objective function of a regularized empirical risk minimization problem (CR-ERM), defined as follows:
where C R ≤ B p is a regularization parameter, and ρ > 0 is the parameter that controls the impact of the regularizer. Suppose thatD is available to the fusion center node, then we can choose the global classifier f : X → Y that minimizes the CR-ERM.
, is used to measure the quality of the classifier trained. We focus on the specific loss functionL ( (1) is a regularizer that prevents overfitting. We have the following assumptions on the loss, regularization functions, and the data. 
A. Distributed ERM
To decentralize CR-ERM, we introduce decision variables { f p } P p=1 , where node p determines its own classifier f p , and impose consensus constraints f 1 = f 2 = ... = f P that guarantee global consistency of the classifiers. Let {w j p } be the auxiliary variables to decouple f p of node p from its neighbors j ∈ N p . Then, the consensus-based reformulation of (1) becomes
where
presents a feasible solution of (2) and the network is connected, then problems (1) and (2) are equivalent, i.e., f = f p , p = 1, . . . , P, where f is a feasible solution of CR-ERM. Problem (2) can be solved in a distributed fashion using the alternative direction method of multiplier (ADMM) with each node p ∈ P optimizing the following distributed regularized empirical risk minimization problem (DR-ERM):
The augmented Lagrange function associated with the DR-ERM is:
The distributed iterations solving (3) are:
According to [5 
, we can combine (7) and (8) 
The ADMM-based distributed ERM iterations (10)-(11) are and summarized in Algorithm 1. Every node p ∈ P updates its local d × 1 estimates f p (t) and λ p (t). At iteration t + 1, node p updates the local f p (t + 1) through (10) . Next, node p broadcasts the latest f p (t + 1) to all its neighboring nodes j ∈ N p . Iteration t + 1 finishes as each node updates the λ p (t + 1) via (11) .
Every iteration of our algorithm is still a minimization problem similar to the centralized problem (1) . However, the number of variables participating in solving (10) per node per iteration is N p , which is much smaller than the one in the centralized problem, which is P p=1 N p . There are several methods to solve (10) . For instance, projected gradient method, Newton method, and Broyden-Fletcher-GoldfarbShanno (BFGS) method [17] that approximates the Newton method, to name a few.
ADMM-based distributed machine learning has benefits due to its high scalability. It also provides some degree of privacy since nodes do not communicate data directly but their decision variable f p . However, the privacy arises when an adversary can make intelligent inferences at each step and extract the sensitive information based on his observation of the learning output of his neighboring nodes. Simple anonymization is not sufficient to address this issue as discussed in Section 1. In the following subsection, we will discuss the adversary models, and present differential privacy solutions.
B. Privacy Concerns
Although the data stored at each node is not exchanged during the entire ADMM algorithm, the potential privacy risk still exists. Suppose that the dataset D p stored at node p contains sensitive information in data point (x i , y i ) that is not allowed to be released to other nodes in the network or anyone else outside. Let K : R d → R be the randomized version of Algorithm 1, and let { f * p } p∈P be the output of K at all the nodes. Then, the output { f * p } p∈P is random. In the distributed version of the algorithm, each node optimizes its local empirical risk based on its own dataset D p . Let K t p be the node-p-dependent stochastic sub-algorithm of K at iteration t, and let f p (t) be the output of
Hence the output f p (t) is stochastic at each t. In this work, we consider the following attack model. The adversary can access the learning outputs of intermediate ADMM iterations as well as the final output. This type of adversary aims to obtain sensitive information about the private data point of the training dataset by observing the output f p (t) of K t p or f * p of K for all p ∈ P at every stage t of the training. We protect the privacy of distributed network using the definition of differential privacy in [2] . Specifically, we require that a change of any single data point in the dataset might only change the distribution of the output of the algorithm slightly, which is visible to the adversary; this is done by adding randomness to the output of the algorithm. Let D p and D p be two datasets differing in one data point; i.e.,
In other words, their Hamming Distance, which is
To protect the privacy against the adversary, we propose the concept of dynamic differential privacy, which enables the dynamic algorithm to be privacy-preserving at every stage of the learning.
Definition 4 [Dynamic α(t)-Differential Privacy (α(t)-DDP)]: Consider a network of P nodes
P = {1, 2, ..
., P}, and each node p has a training dataset D
p , andD = p∈P D p . Let K : R d → R be a randomized version of Algorithm 1. Let α(t) = (α 1 (t), α 2 (t), . . . , α P (t)) ∈ R P + , where α p (t) ∈ R + is
the privacy parameter of node p at iteration t. Let K t p be the node-p-dependent sub-algorithm of K , which corresponds to an ADMM iteration at t that outputs f p (t). Let D p be any dataset with H
We say that the algorithm K is dynamic α p (t)-differentially private (DDP) if for any dataset D p , and for all p ∈ P that can be observed by the adversaries, and for all possible sets of the outcomes S ⊆ R, the following inequality holds:
for all t ∈ Z during a learning process. The probability is taken with respect to f p (t), the output of K t p at every stage t. The algorithm K is called dynamic α(t)-differentially private if the above conditions are satisfied.
Definition 1 provides a suitable differential privacy concept for the adversary. For dynamic α p (t)-differentially private algorithms, the adversaries cannot extract additional information by observing the intermediate updates of f p (t) at each step. Clearly, the algorithm with ADMM iterations shown in (10) to (11) is not dynamic α p (t)-differentially private. This is because the intermediate and final optimal output f p 's are deterministic given dataset
the classifier will change completely, and the probability density Pr([ f p |D p ]) = 0, which leads to the ratio of probabilities
In order to provide the DDP, we propose two algorithms, dual variable perturbation and primal variable perturbation, which are described in Section 3.1 and 3.2, respectively.
III. DYNAMIC PRIVATE PRESERVING
In this section, we introduce two dynamic-differentialprivacy-preserving mechanisms: Dual Variable Perturbations (DVP) and Primal Variable Perturbations (PVP). Both mechanisms are shown to be α(t)-DDP defined in Section II-B. by introducing appropriate noise on the iterative algorithms.
A. Dual Variable Perturbation
We protect the first algorithm based on dual variable perturbation (DVP), in which the dual variables {λ p (t)} P p=1 are perturbed with a random noise vector p (t) ∈ R d with the probability density function K p ( ) ∼ e −ζ p (t ) , where ζ p (t) is a parameter related to the value of α p (t), and · denotes the l 2 norm. In this method, we add one additional term 2 f p 2 to the objective function (3) to ensure that the objective function associated with (13) is at least -strongly convex. At each iteration, we first perturb the dual variable λ p (t), obtained from the last iteration, and store it in a new variable 
As a result, the minimizer of L dual p (t) is random. At each iteration, we first perturb the dual variable λ p (t), obtained from the last iteration, and store it in a new variable μ p (t +1). Now, the iterations (10)-(11) becomes follows:
The iterations (14)- (16) are summarized as Algorithm 2, and are illustrated in Figure 1 (a) and 2. The additional privacy
is required in the proof of Theorem 1 in Appendix A. The two cases ofα p are considered to find the upper bound of the ratio of Jacobian matrices for the transformation from f p (t) to p (t) given different datasets (see details in Appendix A). All nodes have its corresponding value of ρ. Every node p ∈ P updates its local estimates μ p (t), f p (t) and λ p (t) at time t; at time t + 1, node p first perturbs the dual variable λ p (t) obtained at time t to obtain μ p (t + 1) via (14) , and then uses training dataset D p to compute f p (t + 1) via (15) . Next, node p sends f p (t + 1) to all its neighboring nodes. The (t + 1)-th update The final iteration of both DVP and PVP. The perturbed μ p participates in the (15) . As a result, the output f * p is a random variable, and the final output is differentially private.
is done when each node updates its local λ p (t + 1) via (16 
Proof: See Appendix A.
B. Primal Variable Perturbation
In this subsection, we provide the algorithm based on the primal variable perturbation (PVP), which perturbs the primal variable { f p (t + 1)} P p=0 before sending the decision to the neighboring nodes. This algorithm can also provide dynamic differential privacy defined in Definition 1.
be defined as follows, and use L prim p (t) as its short hand notation: (14) . Compute f p (t + 1) via (15) with augmented Lagrange function as (13) . .
Algorithm 2 Dual Variable Perturbation
where p (t + 1) is the random noise vector with the density function K p ( ) ∼ e −ζ p (t ) . The augmented Lagrange function is (9). Let t s be the time when we enter the final iteration.
When t = t s we enter the final iteration at t s , we apply the DVP to update the variables. Specifically, we input the data setsD to DVP and use the { f p (t s − 1)} p and {λ p (t s − 1)} p , obtained from (18) and (20), in iteration (14)- (16):
{ f p (t s + 1)} p∈P is the final output of the PVP algorithm. The iterations (18)- (20) and (21)- (23) are summarized in Algorithm 3, and are illustrated in Figure 1(b) (17) .
Proof: See Appendix B.
IV. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section, we discuss the performance of Algorithm 2 and 3. We establish performance bounds for regularization functions with l 2 norm. Our analysis is based on the following assumptions:
Assumption 7: The data points {(x pi , y pi )} B p i=1 are drawn i.i.d. from a fixed but unknown probability distribution P xy (x pi , y pi ) at each node p ∈ P.
, with the same α p (t) = α(t) (thus the same ζ p (t)) for all p ∈ P at time t ∈ Z.
We then define the expected loss of node p using classifier f p as follows, under Assumption 4:
, and the corresponding expected objective functionẐ is:
The performance of non-private non-distributed ERM classification learning has been already studied by, for example, Shalev et al. in [18] (also see the work of Chaudhuri et al. in [19] ), which introduces a reference classifier f 0 with expected lossĈ( f 0 ), and shows that if the number of data points is sufficiently large, then the actual expected loss of the trained l 2 regularized support vector machine (SVM) classifier f SV M satisfieŝ C( f SV M ) ≤Ĉ 0 + α acc , where α acc is the generalization error. We use a similar argument to study the accuracy of Algorithm 1. Let f 0 be the reference classifier of Algorithm 1. We quantify the performance of our algorithms with f * as the final output by the number of data points required to
However, instead of focusing on only the final output, we care about the learning performance at all iterations. Let f non p (t + 1) = arg min f p L N p (t) be the intermediate updated classifier at t, and let f * = arg min f p Z p ( f p |D p ) be the final output of Algorithm 1. From Theorem 9 (see Appendix A), the sequence { f non p (t)} is bounded and converges to the optimal value f * as time t → ∞. Note that { f non p (t)} is a non-private classifier without added perturbations. Since the optimization is minimization, then there exists a constant non (t) at time t such that:
, and substituting it toĈ( f * ) ≤Ĉ 0 + α acc , yields:
Clearly, the above condition depends on the reference classifier f 0 ; actually, as shown later in this section, the number of data points depends on the l 2 -norm f 0 of the reference classifier. Usually, the reference classifier is chosen with an upper bound on f 0 , say b 0 . Based on (24), we provide the following theorem about the performance of Algorithm 1. 
Proof: See Appendix C. Note that α acc ≤ 1 is required for most machine learning algorithms. In the case of SVM, if the constraints are y i f T x i ≤ c SV M , for i = 1, , . . . , n, where n is the number of data points, then, classification margin is c svm / f . Thus, if we want to maximization the margin c SV M / f 0 we need to choose large value of f 0 . Larger value of f 0 is usually chosen for non-separable or with small margin. In the following section, we provide the performance guarantees of Algorithm 2 and 3. 
A. Performance of Private Algorithms
The performance analysis in Theorem 3 can also be used in DVP and PVP. Specifically, the performance is measured by the number of data points, B p , for all p ∈ P required to obtainĈ( f p (t)) ≤Ĉ 0 (t) + α acc + priv p (t). We say that every learned f p (t) is α acc -optimal if it satisfies the above inequality.
Since in Alg-3, the perturbed primal variable V p (t ) is equal to f p (t ) plus a constant p (t) generated by Algorithm 3 at iteration t, for t ≥ 0, we can find a constant
. Similarly, we measure the performance of V p by the number of data points, B p , for all p ∈ P required to achieveĈ(V p (t)) ≤Ĉ 0 (t) + α acc + primV p (t), whereĈ 0 (t) =Ĉ( f 0 (t)), and f 0 (t) is a reference classifier.
We now establish the performance bounds for Algorithm 2, DVP, which is summarized in the following theorem. 
,
Proof: See Appendix D. 
Proof: See Appendix E. Next, we establish the PVP performance bound of Algorithm 3. Theorem 6 and Corollary 6.1 shows the requirements under which the performance of the part 1 of Algorithm 3 is guaranteed. Corollary 6.2 combines the results from Theorem 5 and Corollary 6.2 to provide the performance bound of the part 2 of Algorithm 3. 
, 
, then, we have (27). have a more significant influence on the requirement of datasets size for DVP than the PVP. Also, the performance of DVP is guaranteed with higher probability than PVP. Therefore, DVP is preferred for more difficult problems. Moreover, the privacy increases by trading the accuracy. It is essential to manage the tradeoff between the privacy and the accuracy, and this will be discussed in Section 5.
V. NUMERICAL EXPERIMENT
In this section, we test Algorithm 2 and 3 with real world training dataset. The dataset used is the Adult dataset from UCI Machine Learning Repository [20] , which contains demographic information such as age, sex, education, occupation, marital status, and native country. In the following sections, we first introduce the logistic regression and show that it is suitable for our algorithms. Second, we test the convergence of the algorithms. Then, the tradeoff between privacy and accuracy is studied. We also propose a method to select the optimum value of α p (t) that balance the privacy-accuracy tradeoff by introducing a utility function of privacy. Note that in the experiments, we fix the value of α p (t) (thus fix the density of noise) for each complete running of algorithms and draw the independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) noise to all the nodes in the network at each iteration.
A. Logistic Regression
In the experiments, we use our algorithm to develop a dynamic differential private logisitic regression. The logistic regression, i.e., L L R takes the following form:
). The first order derivative and the second order derivative are:
, which can be bounded as |L L R | ≤ 1 and |L L R | ≤ , and then it can provide dynamic α p (t)-differential privacy for all t ∈ Z. 
B. Convergence
In our first set of experiments, we study the convergence of the algorithms. The convergence is tested by fixing the value of α p (t) at node p for the entire running of algorithm. As shown in Figure 3 , a larger α p (t) leads to faster convergence of the algorithms; moreover, from Figure 3 , we can see that the DVP is slightly more robust to noise than is the primal case given the same value of α p (t). The empirical loss represents the accuracy of the classifier. Smaller empirical loss means higher accuracy. As can be seen, when α p (t) is small, the model is more private but less accurate. Indeed, there is a tradeoff between privacy and accuracy, which will be studied in the next section.
C. Privacy-Accuracy Tradeoff
In this section, we study the privacy-accuracy tradeoff of Algorithm 2 and 3. The privacy is quantified by the value of α p (t). A larger α p (t) implies that the ratio of the densities of the classifier f p (t) on two different data sets is larger, which implies a higher belief of the adversary when one data point in dataset D is changed; thus, it provides lower privacy. However, the accuracy of the algorithm increases as α p (t) becomes larger. Therefore, there is a decreasing monotonicity between privacy and accuracy.
We proposed a method to find an optimal value of α p (t) that can balance the tradeoff between privacy and accuracy by constructing utility functions of privacy and accuracy, which need to satisfy the following assumptions:
Assumption 16: The utilities of privacy is monotonically decreasing with respect to α p (t) for every p ∈ P and accuracy is monotonically increasing with respect to α p (t) for every p ∈ P.
In this experiment, the accuracy is measured by the empirical loss
Let L acc (·) : R + → R represent the relationship between α p (t) and C(t). The function L acc is obtained by curve fitting given the experimental data points (α p (t), C(t))
. Thus, we model the utility function by L acc in this experiment. As shown in Figure 4 , L acc is monotonically increasing with respect to α p (t) since smaller empirical loss represents higher accuracy. We then construct the utility function of privacy. The utility function of privacy is designed to meet specific requirements of privacy of the users of the algorithm. Let U priv (·) : R + → R be the utility of privacy, same for every node p ∈ P. Besides the decreasing monotonicity, U priv (·) is assumed to be convex and doubly differentiable function of α p (t). In our experiment, we model the utility of privacy as:
, where, ω pj ∈ R ++ for j = 1, 2, 3, 4.
Given the privacy utility function U priv (α p (t)), there exists an optimal value of α * p (t) that minimizes the following problem at time t:
where α U and c 3 are the threshold values for α p (t) and L acc , respectively, beyond which is considered as non-private and non-accurate, respectively. For training the classifier, we use a few fixed values of ρ and test the empirical loss
of the classifier. Then, we select the value of ρ that minimizes the empirical loss for a fixed α p (0.3 in this experiment). We also test the non-private Algorithm 1, and the corresponding minimum ρ is obtained as the control. We choose the corresponding optimal values of the regularization parameter ρ and C R in Table II and III, respectively, Figure 3 shows the convergence of DVP and PVP at different values of α p (t) at a given iteration t. Larger values of α p yield better convergence for both perturbations. Moreover, the DVP has a smaller variance of empirical loss than the primal perturbation does. However, a larger α p leads to poorer privacy. Figure 4 
(t).
As shown in Figure 3 , the empirical loss of DVP is more robust to noise than the PVP for most values of α p (t). Moreover, the dual perturbation yields a lower error rate for a large range of values of α p (t), which implies a better management of tradeoff between privacy and accuracy. Figure 5 shows the privacyaccuracy tradeoff of the final optimum classifier in terms of the empirical loss and misclassification error rate (MER). The MER is determined by the fraction of times the trained classifier predicts a wrong label. Since we are interested in α p (t) < 1, we can see that PVP performs slightly better than DVP with respect to the empirical loss for α p (t) < 1.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this work, we have developed two ADMM-based algorithms to solve a centralized regularized ERM in a distributed fashion while providing α-differential privacy for the ADMM iterations as well as the final trained output. Thus, the sensitive information stored in the training dataset at each node is protected against both the internal and the external adversaries.
Based on distributed training datasets, Algorithm 2 perturbs the dual variable λ p (t − 1) generated at iteration t − 1 for every node p ∈ P at iteration t before the update of the primal variable f p (t). In Algorithm 3, we perturb the primal variable f p (t), whose noisy version V p (t) is then released to the neighboring nodes. Since the primal variables are shared among all the neighboring nodes, at time t, the noise directly involved in the optimization of parameter update comes from multiple nodes; as a result, the updated primal variable has more randomness than the dual perturbation case.
In general, the accuracy decreases as privacy requirements are more stringent. The tradeoff between the privacy and accuracy is studied through numerical experiments. Our experiments are conducted using real data from UCI Machine Learning Repository.
There are two criteria to measure the performance of the algorithms. One is the performance of balancing the privacyaccuracy tradeoff; the other is the performance of learning that is quantified by the number of data points required to achieve α acc -optimal results shown in Section IV. Our experiments show that the primal variable perturbation slightly outperforms the dual variable perturbation in balancing the privacy-accuracy tradeoff, while our theoretical analysis shows that the dual variable perturbation outperforms the primal variable perturbation in the performance of learning.
APPENDIX A PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Proof (Theorem 1): Let f p (t + 1) be the optimal primal variable with zero duality gap. From the Assumption 1 and 2, we know that both the loss funciton L and the regularizer R(·) are differentiable and convex, and by using the Karush-KuhnTucker (KKT) optimality condition (stationarity), we have the relationship between the noise p (t) and the optimal primal variable f p (t + 1) as: 
we have to show:
We first bound the ratio of the determinant of Jacobian matrices, and then the ratio of conditional densities of the noise vectors.
Let x a be the a-th element of the vector x, and (a, b) . Let E ∈ R d×d be a matrix, then let E (a,b) denote the (a, b)-th entry of the matrix E. Thus, the (m, n)-th entry of
, then the Jacobian matrix can be expressed as:
Let h j (W) be the j -th largest eigenvalue of a symmetric matrix W ∈ R d×d with rank θ . Then, we have the following fact: det(I + W) = θ j (1 + h j (W)). Since the matrix x i x T i has rank 1, matrix M has rank at most 2; thus matrix H −1 M has rank at most 2; therefore, we have:
Thus, the ratio of determinants of the Jacobian matrices can be expressed as:
Based on Assumption 2, all the eigenvalues of ∇ 2 R( f p (t + 1)) is greater than 1 [21] . Thus, from Assumption 1, matrix H has all eigenvalues at least
Let σ i (M) be the non-negative singular value of the symmetric matrix M. According to [22] , we have the inequality
be the trace norm of X. Then, according to the trace norm inequality, we have
. As a result, based on the upper bounds from Assumption 1 and 3, we have:
Finally, the ratio of determinants of Jacobian matrices is bounded as:
Now, we bound the ratio of densities of p (t). Let sur(E) be the surface area of the sphere in d dimension with radius E, and sur(E) = sur(1) · E d−1 . We can write:
whereα p is a constant satisfying the above inequality. Since we want to bound the ratio of densities of f p (t + 1) as 
Dividing both sides by ρ V A − V B gives:
From ( 
Proof (Lemma 17):
Since Z is a gamma random variable (k, θ), then we can express Z as Z = are independent, we have:
If R( f p (t)) =
